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In a vigorous dissent, the chief judge argued the majority had
raised the threshold for establishing standing by "erecting standing
hurdles so high as to effectively excise the citizen suit provision from
the Clean Water Act." He also contended that the holding required
courts to litigate scientific facts as a matter of standing and that the
"fairly traceable" requirement was not equivalent to a requirement of
tort causation. The chiefjudge would have permitted the citizens' suit
upon a finding that the case satisfied the case-or-controversy
requirement of Article III.
StephaniePickens

United States v. Smithfield Foods, No. 97-2709, 1999 WL 713847 (4th
Cir. Sept. 14, 1999) (affirming the district court's finding of plaintiff's
liability, but reversing and remanding for recalculation of penalty).
Smithfield Foods ("Smithfield") owned and operated two swine
slaughtering and processing plants that discharged wastewater into the
Pagan River located in Virginia. The discharged wastewater contained
pollutants regulated under the Clean Water Act ("CWA") thus
requiring a permit under a process overseen by the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") and locally administered by the Virginia
State Water Control Board ("Board"). In 1986, the Board issued
Smithfield a permit ("1986 Permit") for discharge of a restricted
amount of pollutants into the Pagan River.
At the time of the issuance of the 1986 Permit, Virginia issued new
regulations stating all permits required modification to lower the
monthly average of phosphorus discharged into rivers. In 1990, the
Board modified the 1986 Permit, resulting in a new permit ("1990
Permit") that instructed Smithfield to comply with the more restrictive
state phosphorus limitation within three years.
Smithfield and Virginia began negotiations that resulted in an
agreement involving various accommodations ("1990 Order").
Smithfield agreed to investigate the feasibility of connecting its plants
to the local sanitation system in order to resolve its wastewater
treatment problem, while the Board agreed to postpone
commencement of the compliance schedule for roughly one year.
The Board amended the 1990 Order in May of 1991 ("1991 Order").
The 1991 Order stated that if Smithfield chose to connect its systems
to the local sanitation system, it must do so within three months of the
In
notification that the necessary equipment was operational.
addition, the 1991 Order mandated Smithfield comply with interim
regulations until the connection was complete. The 1991 Order
explicitly stated that it did not modify the 1990 Permit. Smithfield
notified the Board of its decision to connect its facilities to the existing
sanitation system on June 7, 1991.
Contemporaneous to the 1991 Order, the 1990 Permit expired.
The Board composed a new permit. The proposed permit contained
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the same compliance schedule as the 1990 Permit requiring
compliance with the phosphorus discharge limitations by January 4,
1993. A Board environmental engineer assured Smithfield that any
special order agreements approved by the Board would take
precedence over the permit. The Board issued Smithfield the new
permit ("1992 Permit"). Smithfield met neither the January 4, 1993
deadline for phosphorus discharge required by the 1992 Permit nor
the May 13, 1994 deadline for all other substances. Smithfield
eventually achieved complete connection to the local sanitation facility
in August 1997.
Virginia filed an enforcement action in the state circuit court in
1996. The government filed its own suit on December 16, 1996
alleging that Smithfield violated the CWA by discharging pollutants
into the Pagan River at levels exceeding those specified in the 1992
Permit. The government moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted summary judgment in July 1997 in favor of the United
States as to Smithfield's liability and calculated 6,982 days of violations
and assessed a penalty of $12.6 million.
On July 9, 1997 the state court, in hearing the action commenced
by Virginia, determined that the 1991 Order superseded the 1992
Permit and, as a result, Smithfield only had to comply with the
phosphorus limits within three months of connecting to the local
sanitation system. Thus, Smithfield filed a motion to dismiss the
government's action. The district court refused to reverse its finding
of liability or calculation of penalty. Smithfield appealed on three
grounds.
, Smithfield first contended that the 1991 Order superseded the
1992 Permit. The court, in agreement with the district court, held the
1991 Order did not take precedence over the 1992 Permit. The court
held that because Smithfield had not followed a formal permit
modification procedure, none of the letters or statements issued by the
Board after the issuance of the 1992 Permit were sufficient to
constitute modification.
The court addressed both aspects of Smithfield's second
contention in turn. First, Smithfield argued that the CWA provided
that if a state pursued an action under state law, any sufficiently
comparable federal civil enforcement action was precluded. The
court, relying on the analysis of the district court, concluded that state
action was not sufficiently comparable to the federal civil enforcement
to bar the federal action because Virginia did not have the authority to
assess penalties without the violator's consent. In addition, Virginia's
statutory structure did not provide adequate procedures for notice and
public participation. In the alternative, Smithfield argued that the
United States Supreme Court's previous holding that in some cases a
violator's corrective action would be sufficient to override the
assessment of penalties precluded the federal suit. The court of
appeals determined, in agreement with the previous findings of the
district court, that the corrective action taken by Smithfield did not
achieve compliance, thus was insufficient to overcome the penalty
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assessment. Rejecting Smithfield's first two contentions, the court
upheld the district court's ruling on Smithfield's affirmative liability.
The court then addressed Smithfield's final contention that the
trial court incorrectly assessed $12.6 million in penalties, reversing and
remanding the action to the district court for penalty recalculation.
The court applied the abuse of discretion standard of review and
considered factors established by the CWA for determining an
appropriate civil penalty. In addition, the court gave the district
court's award wide discretion.
In considering Smithfield's various claims of error in relation to
the penalty, the court only disagreed with the findings of the district
court on one count. The district court utilized the weighted average
cost of capital to calculate the present value of interest. In doing so,
the district court determined that the approximate four percent
calculation error was insignificant in relation to the $12.6 million
overall penalty. The court of appeals disagreed. The four percent
calculation error resulted in a miscalculation of between $100,000 and
$200,000. The court concluded no reason existed for an admitted
error to go uncorrected. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded
the penalty determination to the district court to recalculate the
penalty.
Sarah E. McCutcheon

SIXTH CIRCUIT
Michigan Peat v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 175 F.3d 422
(6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the federal district court had subject
matterjurisdiction over the Environmental Protection Agency and the
State of Michigan had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity).
Michigan Peat engaged in business activities that included the
extraction of peat within a wetland area. In 1991 and 1994, it applied
for a wetland permit application under section 404 of the Clean Water
Act ("CWA"). According to the combined Michigan and federal
permitting process, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
must review a permit application and comment on it. The EPA
reviewed the application of Michigan Peat and objected to the
expansion of the mining program. In response, it created a new draft
permit and submitted it to Michigan Peat. The draft permit did not
allow expansion into any unmined area but granted other requested
actions with various conditions. Michigan Peat did not sign and return
the draft permit. Instead, it accepted certain portions of the permit
and contested the unacceptable elements. The Michigan Department
of Environmental Quality issued Michigan Peat a state-only permit
and suggested that Michigan Peat contact the United States Army
Corp of Engineers ("Corps") for federal authorization. Michigan Peat

